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Financial markets are typically characterized by high (low) price
level and low (high) volatility during boom (bust) periods, suggesting
that price and volatility tend to move together with diﬀerent market
conditions/states. By proposing a simple heterogeneous agent model
of fundamentalists and chartists with Markov chain regime-dependent
expectations and applying S&P 500 data from January 2000 to June
2010, we show that the estimation of the model matches well with the
boom and bust periods in the US stock market. In addition, we ﬁnd
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that the model exhibits good forecasting accuracy.
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21 Introduction
Financial markets undergo episodes of dramatic changes. A striking example
is the October 19, 1987 crash, when the S&P 500 Index lost more than 20%
of its value in one day. Such remarkable breaks are not infrequent. In fact it
is no surprise to ﬁnd such breaks repeat themselves in a variety of booms and
busts, if one traces back the ﬁnancial market for a suﬃciently long period.
They include, for instance, the dot-com bubble from 1995 to 2000 and the
subsequent bust from 2000 to 2003, the market euphoria from 2006-2007,
and the 2007-2009 ﬁnancial meltdown that followed.
Financial economists have long debated the causes of the apparent changes
in the generating process of ﬁnancial time series. Apart from reasons com-
monly referred to such as wars and government policy change, behavioural
heterogeneity among investors has been shown to be a key factor1. The
trading behaviour of heterogeneous agents can lead to various types of price
changes that characterize ﬁnancial crises (Huang et al 2010a). The hetero-
geneous agents model (HAM) literature developed over the last two decades
has demonstrated that both deterministic (Day and Huang 1990; Brock and
Hommes 1998; He and Westerhoﬀ 2005; Huang et al 2010a) and stochastic
HAMs (Chiarella et al 2003; Gallegati et al 2010; He and Li 2007), that
address the heterogeneity in investment behaviour, are able to capture the
extreme movement in the asset price without explicitly modelling it2.
The successful experience of HAMs in capturing typical ﬁnancial phenom-
ena has inspired recent literature to estimate such models. This strand of the
HAM literature ﬁrst models behavioural heterogeneity as a default assump-
tion and then estimates the parameters that capture the heterogeneity by
applying ﬁnancial time series techniques. Statistically signiﬁcant estimations
of such parameters indicate the presence of heterogeneity. Gilli and Winker
(2003) and de Jong et al (2011) document the existence of behavioural hetero-
geneity, namely the simultaneous presence of fundamentalists and chartists,
in foreign exchange markets. Boswijk et al (2007) and Frijns et al (2010) ﬁnd
similar evidence in the stock market and the options market respectively. De
1See for example Day and Huang (1990), Brock and Hommes (1998), Chiarella et al
(2003), Huang et al (2010a), among many others.
2These models (see recent survey papers by Hommes 2006 and Chiarella et al 2009)
construct dynamic mechanisms that are able to generate price series with bubbles and
crashes. They do so without assuming that the price experiences a jump or break in some
periods.
3Jong et al (2009) even show that behavioural heterogeneity contributes to
the contagion eﬀect during crises3.
Most estimations referred above assume that heterogeneous agents ex-
pect the prices or returns to evolve as a linear (or linearly auto-regressive)
process, even though the price or return is modeled as a non-linear dynami-
cal system. This assumption however is not well supported by the prevalent
empirical evidence that stock returns follow a complicated process with mul-
tiple regimes (Ang and Bekaert, 2002) and that such a non-linear process
aﬀects investment decisions (Cooper et al. 2004). Guidolin and Timmer-
mann (2007, 2008) show that the asset returns switch among four states,
namely, crash, slow growth, bull and recovery states, and that investors’
behaviour varies with these states. Explicitly incorporating such regime-
dependent properties of price into investors’ beliefs could improve the model
ﬁtness both theoretically and empirically. Huang et al (2010b) show that a
HAM that allows investors’ beliefs to be regime-dependent better matches
with ﬁnancial market data than those without. Speciﬁcally such a model is
capable of duplicating most of the stylized facts (excessive volatility, volatility
clustering, asymmetric return, long-range dependence, gradual bubbles and
sudden crashes), both quantitatively and statistically. By explicitly model-
ing chartists’ sentiment as regime-dependent, Manzan and Westerhoﬀ (2007)
ﬁnd such a model has good in-sample explanatory power. They also show
that in some cases, such a model exhibits more accurate forecasting ability
than the simple random walk model that beats many structural exchange
rate models (Meese and Rogoﬀ 1983). These ﬁndings suggest that it is of
value to account for the regime-dependent properties explicitly in modeling
investors’ beliefs and its impact on the price dynamic.
A natural question is how to model the regime? The few papers in the
HAM literature that account for the regime-dependent property explicitly
tend to pre-specify the regime according to a directly observable variable,
such as price. For example, Huang et al (2010a) determine the regime ac-
cording to the support and resistance price level in technical trading. Manzan
and Westerhoﬀ (2007) assume chartist sentiment to be in one regime when
the absolute return is larger than a threshold value and in another regime
when the opposite scenario happens. In these studies, it is from the pre-
3Studies that estimate behavioural heterogeneity include Baak (1999), Chavas (2000),
Amilon (2008) and Franke (2009). Other studies that estimate HAMs but do not focus on
behavioural heterogeneity includes Alfarano et al (2005), Goldbaum and Mizrach (2008)
and Westerhoﬀ and Reitz (2005).
4speciﬁed regimes that one understands the price generating process. But
what if the regime cannot be pre-determined? In most cases, the change in
regime is a random variable rather than the outcome of a perfectly deter-
ministic event. This suggests that one considers the price to be inﬂuenced
by a random variable st describing the state or regime of the process at t
(Hamilton, 1994). The regime switch is then governed by a description of
the probability law. This way, we are able to let the data generating process
determine in which regime it is, instead of the other way around.
Following Uhlig (2010), we assume that the market is governed by two
aggregate states, a boom state and a bust state. In the ‘boom’ state, the
market is prosperous - the price is increasing and the volatility is typically
low. In the ‘bust’ state however, the market is depressed, characterized by de-
clining price and high volatility. This can be illustrated in Fig. 1 by plotting
the S&P 500 index and VIX, the Chicago Board Options Exchange Market
Volatility Index and a popular measure of the implied volatility of S&P 500
index. It is worth pointing out that, during the recent credit crunch, the S&P
500 drops from 1521 in October 2007, when the market reaches an historical
high, to 757 in March 2009, when the market hits the regional bottom, losing
more than half of its value. Meanwhile, the VIX surges substantially from
18 in October 2007 to 46 in March 2009. During this period, VIX reaches its
peak 79 on October 2008, soon after Lehman Brothers collapses. This value
is more than 4 times of its value in October 2007. It is further observed
from the ﬁgure that, the price and volatility tend to move together (in the
opposite direction) with diﬀerent market conditions corresponding to boom
and bust states. In fact, Jacod and Todorov (2010) have documented such
observation by providing empirical evidence that most stock market jumps
are associated with volatility jumps.
Under the assumption that there are two states in the market, the random
variable st takes the value of 0 when the market is in the boom state and 1
in the bust state. The value of st changes as the market transits from one
state to the other over time. By further assuming st to be a discrete-valued
random variable in a Markov chain, the HAM is essentially a Markov-regime-
switching model. Currently, there is a lack of literature in estimating HAMs
under Markov regime switching. The few exceptions are Vigfusson (1997)
and Ahrens and Reitz (2005), who apply a Markov regime switching model
to estimate a HAM in the foreign exchange market. These papers assume that
the market is fully populated by either fundamentalists or chartists in each
period. Although they ﬁnd signiﬁcant switching between fundamentalists
























Figure 1: The time series of the S&P 500 and the VIX.
and chartists, they can not answer the question of whether there is cross
sectional behavioural heterogeneity in the market, as investors in any given
period are homogeneous. Holding the belief that various types of investors
present in the market simultaneously, we are interested in ﬁnding out how
heterogeneous investors update their beliefs under Markov regime switching,
rather than looking for how investors universally switch from one strategy to
another.
Apart from the standard assumption on the behaviour of fundamentalists
who trade based on the fundamental value of the risky asset, this paper adds
to the current literature in two respects. First, by assuming that the market
is governed by a two-state Markov chain process, both chartists and noise
traders update their beliefs in diﬀerent ways, leading to a Markov-switching
HAM. Such a set up captures the time-varying heterogeneity within the same
type of investor group, apart from the between-group heterogeneity arising
from diﬀerent trading groups. Second, the unobserved state captures the
underlying ﬁnancial and economic mechanism throughout the observed time
period. Its transition probability is estimated through the Markov-regime
6switching HAM where fundamentalists, chartists and noise traders partic-
ipate in the market simultaneously. By estimating the Markov-switching
HAM on S&P 500 monthly data from January 2000 to June 2010, we show
that the estimation of the model matches well with the high (low) price level
and low (high) volatility during boom (bust) state of the market. In addition,
we ﬁnd evidence of time-varying within-group behavioural heterogeneity and
the model exhibits better forecasting accuracy compared to that of Boswijk
et al (2007) for the sample period.
The rest of the paper is organized as following. Section 2 develops a
Markov-regime switching HAM consisting of fundamentalists, chartists, and
noise traders. Section 3 estimates the two-state Markov regime switching
model by using S&P 500 data and discusses the estimation results. Sec-
tion 4 compares the forecasting ability of our model with that of Boswijk
et al (2007). Section 5 concludes. Some related issues are discussed in the
Appendix.
2 The Model
Following the standard HAM literature (see for example Day and Huang
(1990), Lux (1995), Brock and Hommes (1998), Farmer and Joshi (2002)
and Chiarella and He (2003)), we consider a market with a risky asset and
three types of traders, fundamentalists, chartists and noise traders (or liquid-
ity providers) who are diﬀerentiated by their information and beliefs about
the asset value as well as their trading strategies, together with a market
maker who adjusts the market price in response to the aggregate excess de-
mand of the three types of traders. The fundamentalists are assumed to have
information about the long-term fundamental value, which is determined by
real economic activity, and to trade based on their belief that the expected
future market price is given by the fundamental value. However, both the
chartists and noise traders trade based on market conditions and historical
prices, instead of the fundamental value4. To characterize the high price
level and low volatility during boom periods and the low price level and high
volatility during bust periods, the market conditions are assumed to follow
a two-state Markov regime switching process. We assume that chartists and
noise traders share the same perception on the market conditions. Chartists
4This is either motivated by the fact that the collection of the information about the
fundamental value can be expensive or due to the nature of the chartists and noise traders.
7are concerned with the short-term market value, vt. A boom (bust) mar-
ket condition is then characterized by optimistic (pessimistic) investment
sentiment and increasing (decreasing) risk appetite is associated with a rel-
atively high (low) value of vt. The noise traders place their orders et, which
are drawn from an N(0, σ2
n,t) distribution. The conditional volatility σ2
n,t is
regime-dependent and is relatively lower (higher) in a boom (bust) market
condition. We shall discuss the regime-dependent properties in detail later.
In the following, we ﬁrst describe the three types of traders and their trading
strategies, and then consider the price impact function that relates the price
to the excess demand.
2.1 Fundamentalists
The fundamentalists are assumed to have information of the fundamental
value, ut, and believe that the expected asset price pt is given by the fun-
damental value, that is Ef,t−1(pt) = ut. Therefore they buy (sell) the risky
asset when the current pt−1 is below (above) ut. Their demand function is
given by
Df,t = αf[Ef,t−1(pt) − pt−1] = αf (ut − pt−1), (1)
where αf > 0 measures the speed of mean-reversion of the market price to
the fundamental value.
For estimation purpose, the long-term fundamental value ut can be de-
rived from the static Gordon growth model (Gordon, 1959), so that ut =
dt(1 + g)/(r − g), where dt is the dividend ﬂow, g is the average growth
rate of dividends and r is the average required return (or the discount rate).
Following Fama and French (2002), we assume that r equals to the sum of
the average dividend yield y and the average rate of capital gain x, that is
r = y+x. The Gordon model then implies that x is equal to g. Consequently,
ut = dt (1 + g)/y. (2)
Hence ut is equal to the current dividend times a constant multiplier (1 + g)/y,
which is also called the fundamental price to cash ﬂow ratio.
The calculation of the static fundamental value assumes the growth rate
and the rate of capital gain to be constants at their average values, g and r.
Alternatively, one can obtain a dynamic fundamental value that accounts for
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While the fundamentalists refer to the fundamental value for trading deci-
sions, the chartists rely on the forward-looking short-term market value of
the risky asset, vt, which is extrapolated or estimated from historical prices6.
They extrapolate the current market price pt−1 by the market price deviation
from the short-term market value, pt−1 − vt−1, that is
Ec,t−1(pt) = pt−1 + β (pt−1 − vt−1),
where β  = 0 is the extrapolation rate of the chartists. The demand function
of chartists is assumed to be given by
Dc,t = η[Ec,t−1(pt) − pt−1] = ηβ (pt−1 − vt−1),
where η > 0 is a constant.
All the chartists hold the same beliefs about the short-term market value,
vt, which is updated in every period so as to incorporate the market condition.
They however engage in two diﬀerent trading strategies, based on which we
classify them into two types, namely chartists A and chartists B. Chartists
A believe that β = β1 > 0, that is, the market price pt will deviate further
away from the current price pt−1 by the price trend represented by the price
5See Boswijk et al (2007) for a detailed derivation of the dynamic Gordon growth
model, in which the approximation in the second line is obtained by a ﬁrst-order Taylor
expansion around the mean of r, and the third line is derived by assuming the expectations
of future ex-ante required returns and cash ﬂow growth rate follow an AR(1) process such
that Et (rt+1 − r) = ρ(rt − r) and Et (gt+1 − g) = φ(gt − g).
6It could also be interpreted as a price trend, benchmark price or target price, against
which traders compare their most recent price observation.
9deviation from the short-term market value, pt−1 − vt−1. They behave like
trend followers or momentum traders when the short-term market value vt
is estimated based on some price trend. Hence the excess demand function
of chartists A is given by
DcA,t = βA (pt−1 − vt−1), (3)
where βA = ηβ1 > 0. Such a chartist behaves like the investor-β in Day and
Huang (1990). Chartists B believe β = −β2 < 0 with β2 > 0, and bet on
the reversal of the price trend. Instead of expecting that the price will follow
the price trend, they believe the price trend will reverse in the next period.
They behave like contrarians (see Chiarella and He (2002) for a HAM with
both trend followers and contrarians). Hence, their excess demand function
is given by
DcB,t = βB (vt−1 − pt−1), (4)
where βB = ηβ2 > 0.
What is innovative in the set up is the speciﬁcation of the short-term
market value vt. Instead of estimating it from some (weighted) moving av-
erages as in the current HAM literature, we assume it to be state-dependent
and allow it to switch among two diﬀerent states, as discussed earlier. Specif-
ically, vt is assumed to be contingent on the state st, which takes discrete
value of 0 or 1 so that st ∈ S = {0,1}. The dynamics of the state aim
at capturing the changes in market conditions through the observed prices.
The state st is modelled as a stationary ergodic two-state Markov chain on
S with transition probabilities given by
P (st = j|st−1 = i,st−2 = k,...) = P (st = j|st−1 = i) = Pi,j (5)
for i,j,k ∈ S, where Pi,j indicates the probability that state (regime) i
transits to state j for i,j ∈ {0,1}. The transition probabilities are constants
and satisfy the condition
1 X
j=0
Pi,j = 1 and 0 ≤ Pi,j ≤ 1 for i = 0,1. The
state st is a random variable that is not directly observable. However, a ﬁlter
estimate can be computed from the time series of the price. Some ﬁlters such
as sequential ﬁlter are capable of performing accurate inferences of the state
st (see the algorithm in Carvalho and Lopes, 2007). It is therefore reasonable
to assume that the chartists, who are supposed to be strong in quantitative
10analysis, can estimate the state with high precision. The regime-dependent
vt is then given by
vt =
￿
v0, st = 0,
v1, st = 1. (6)
2.3 Noise Traders
The noise traders do not gauge the fundamental value or extrapolate the
price trend. They do however develop a general understanding of the market
condition, say, from the market report generated by chartists, who are typi-
cally enthusiastic in promoting their analysis. The demand function of noise
traders can be written as
Dn,t = et,
where et is a noise term drawn from an N(0, σ2
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n,1), st = 1. (7)
2.4 Market Maker
The market maker collects orders from the fundamentalists, chartists and
noise traders, then subsequently adjusts the price according to the excess
demand with a speed of γ > 0. Using ω1, ω2, ω3 and ω4 to denote the
market weights (or fractions) of fundamentalists, chartists A, chartists B,
and noise traders, the price impact function can be written as
∆pt = pt − pt−1
= γ{[αfω1 (ut − pt−1) + βAω2 (pt−1 − vt−1) + βBω3 (vt−1 − pt−1) + ω4et]}
= α(ut − pt−1) + β (pt−1 − vt−1) + εt,
(8)
where the third line is obtained by setting α = γαfω1, β = γ (βAω2 − βBω3)
and εt = γω4et. A positive β suggests that the trading activities of chartists
A dominate that of chartists B, while a negative β indicates that the market
power of chartists A is subordinate to chartists B. The distribution of εt
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1), st = 1, (9)
11where σ0 = γω4σn,0 and σ1 = γω4σn,1. As vt and εt are regime-dependent,




We use data from Shiller (2005) that consists of monthly data of S&P 500
index, dividends and the consumer price index (CPI) from January 2000
to June 2010. To obtain a fair evaluation of the price level over time, the
nominal value of both stock price and dividends are discounted by the CPI
and converted to real value. Unless otherwise speciﬁed, all the data discussed
hereafter are in real term.
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Figure 2: Stock price, fundamental value, dividend, and dividend yield. The
top panel plots the S&P 500 discounted by CPI, as well as dynamic and
static fundamental values from January 2000 to June 2010. The bottom
panel graphs the dividend and dividend yield over the same period.
12Table 1: Summary Statistics. Sample period is from January 2000 to June
2010.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
pt 1328.93 243.42 776.33 1874.90
Static ut 1291.43 190.80 1061.51 1643.21
dynamic ut 1289.16 176.55 1057.96 1612.96
dt 23.15 3.42 19.03 29.45
dt/pt−1 1.79 .48 1.09 3.52
gt .03 .99 −2.95 1.95
rt 1.82 .96 −.15 4.41
it .04 .01 .02 .06
dt/pt−1, gt , rt and it are expressed as percent. N = 126.
As shown in Fig. 2, the static and dynamic fundamental values track
each other closely. Both series increase gradually before reversing in 2009.
Table 1 shows that the average static (dynamic) fundamental value is 1291
(1289), with a standard deviation of 191 (177). It is not surprising to see
that the divided (bottom panel) exhibits the same pattern as the fundamental
value, given that the static fundamental value is essentially the product of
a constant multiplier and the dividend (see Eq.(2)). Fig.2 suggests that
there is not a simple pattern of how price relates to fundamental value.
The stock price deviates from its fundamental value between 2000 and 2003
during which time the dot-com bubble burst, and between 2008 to 2009 when
the credit crunch unfolded. The price co-moves with the fundamental value
broadly during 2003 to 2007 when the ﬁnancial market is booming. Over all,
the price ranges between 776 and 1875. The standard deviation of price is
243, which is greater than that of the fundamental value.
What is worth pointing out is that the dividend yield remains quite stable
when the price and its fundamental value move in tandem and increase sub-
stantially during crisis episodes, especially during the recent credit crunch.
Speciﬁcally, the dividend yield reaches its peak at 3.5% soon after the price
hits its bottom in March 2010. Also presented in Table 1 are the the average
growth rate of dividend, gt, which is 0.03% and the average required return
rt, which equals 1.82%. The average monthly interest rate of the 10 year
treasury bill it, the risk free interest rate, is 0.04 percent. As in Fama and
French (2002), the risk premium equals the average required return minus
the average risk free interest rate. Our sample yields an equity premium of
13Table 2: Estimation results. Sample period is from January 2000 to June
2010.
Variable α β v0 v1 σ0 σ1 P0,0 P0,1
Coeﬃcient −.002 −.045 665.711 1607.064 63.561 31.588 .945 .049
p-value .948 .107 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .120
log-likelihood=−663.101, AIC=10.652
1.79% per month7.
3.2 The Estimation Results
We estimate the Markov regime switching model deﬁned in (8), (6), and
(9) by using the maximum likelihood method (Hamilton, 1994, Chapter 22).
As demonstrated in Fig. 3, the ﬁtted value based on our model matches
well the real price series and the 1-step ahead prediction captures the ups
and downs of the price movements even when they are extreme. Table 2
presents the detailed estimation results, based on which we have the following
observations.
The estimate of α is not statistically signiﬁcant. The estimate of β is
negative, suggesting that the trading activities of chartists B dominate those
of chartists A8. The regime-dependent short-term market values estimated
7This value is much higher than that in Boswijk et al (2007) and Fama and French
(2002), both of which use annual data. Boswijk et al. (2007) obtain a risk premium
of 4.84% per year in the period 1871-1950 and 2.16% for the period 1951-2003. Fama
and French (2002) estimate the expected real equity premium to be 4.17% per year for
1872 - 1950 and 7.43% for 1950 - 2000. The large diﬀerences in equity premium between
our estimation and that of current literature could arise from data frequency and sample
period. Fama and French (2002) ﬁnd that the risk premium for 1872 to 2000 is 3.54%,
which is much lower than that obtained from the two sub-samples. Their ﬁnding suggests
that a longer sample period might yield a relatively lower equity premium. Given the short
sample period in this paper, one would expect a higher equity premium in our sample.
Perhaps more importantly, in our sample, the dividend as well as the dividend yield grows
substantially as shown in Fig 2 while the interest rate exhibits a declining trend, all of
which contribute to the increase in the equity premium.
8The estimate of β does not seem to be very signiﬁcant. The lack of signiﬁcance
is caused by the multicollinearity problem, which leads to relatively large estimates of
standard errors of the correlated variables. We can easily reject the null hypothesis that
α = β = 0, suggesting that at least one of the coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant in explaining
the regressand. The multicollinearity however only aﬀects the estimates of the correlated
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Figure 3: The index, ﬁtted value, and 1-step-ahead prediction. The solid line
represents the S&P 500 Index discounted by the CPI, the dashed line plots
the ﬁtted value from the estimation of Eq. (8), the circles correspond to the
1-step ahead forecasts, and the shaded areas indicate the regime 0.
from our model are v0 = 666 and v1 = 1607 in states 0 and 1. respectively. It
is no surprise to see from Fig. 3 that, in general, the price moves towards v0
(v1) in states 0 (state 1), as the dominant chartists B bet on the reversal of the
price trend. As the short-term market value is updated in correspondence to
the unobserved state over time, The trading behaviour of chartists B varies
accordingly. It indicates the existence of behavioural heterogeneity within
the chartist group.
The regime-dependent standard deviations are found to be σ0 = 64 and
σ1 = 32 in states 0 and 1, respectively. Note that the volatility in state 0
is twice as much as that in state 1, suggesting that noise traders are much
more sensitive to external news in state 0 than in state 1. The diﬀerent
behaviour of noise traders in diﬀerent states provides evidence of within-
variables but not the overall goodness-of-ﬁt of the model. We provide a detailed discussion
on this issue in Appendix A.
15group heterogeneity over time.
The switching of the beliefs of the chartists and noise traders between the
two states are indicated by the transition probabilities. The chartists do not
ﬁx their beliefs for short-term market value over time. Instead, they switch
their forecast from v0 to v1 or vice versa with a time-varying probability.
Similarly, noise traders adjust their degree of reaction according to the market
condition diﬀerentiated by the state variable st. The results in Table 2 show
that the probability of remaining in state 0 is 94.5% (P0,0), suggesting that
the bust state is persistent on average for 1/(1 − P0,0) ≈ 18 months. It
means that the probability for chartists to stay in the relatively low short-
term market value v0 and for the noise trader to submit orders that follow
an N(0, σ2
0) distribution is 94.5%. Given the two states identiﬁed, this also
means that the probability for the chartists and noise traders to switch their
forecast from state 0 to 1 is 5.5% (P1,0). Similarly, the chartists maintain
their original estimates of v1 and σ2
1 in state 1 with a probability of 95.1%
(P1,1) and switch to state 0 with a probability of 4.9% (P0,1).
Overall, we ﬁnd statistically signiﬁcant results on the regime-dependence
of vt and σt, which indicate the existence of time-varying within-group het-
erogeneity. This means that traders in both the group of chartists and noise
traders adapt their trading strategy according to the state variable st, which
gives rise to the within-group behavioural heterogeneity.
Most interestingly, the estimated states match very well to the two states
the model proposed in Section 2. State 0 is associated with relatively high
volatility (high risk) and low short-term market value, which characterizes
the bust (turbulent or crisis) periods. State 1 is accompanied by a relatively
low volatility (low risk) and high short-term market value, which captures the
salient feature of boom (tranquil) periods. What is perhaps more interesting
is how chartists update their forecast for the short-term market value vt and
how noise traders adapt their degree of reaction over time, especially during
periods of ﬁnancial crisis. We have obtained estimates of the coeﬃcients as
well as the transition probabilities. Conditional on the whole price series
{p1,...,pN}, we now calculate the smoothed probability P (st = j|p1,...,pN)
for each date (for details of the algorithm, see Kim and Nelson, 1999). Fig.4
shows the smoothed probability for vt and σt to fall into the two states over
the sample period of January 2000 to June 2010. The bust periods cor-
responding to state 0 cover the two latest episodes of ﬁnancial crisis - the
2000-2003 dot-com crash and the 2007-2009 credit crunch. During these pe-
riods, chartists extrapolated the short-term market value to be v0 = 666 and








Figure 4: Smoothed transition probability. The upper panel plots the
smoothed probabilities for the price to be in regime 0. The bottom panel
plots the smoothed probability of being in regime 1. Periods that are classi-
ﬁed under the speciﬁed category are shaded accordingly.
noise traders expected the volatility to be σ0 = 64. The boom periods corre-
sponding to state 1 include the time from late 2003 to early 2007, when the
stock market was prospering. During these periods, most chartists upgraded
the short-term market value to be v1 = 1607 while noise traders downgraded
their volatility forecasts to σ1 = 32.
Recently, after the market hit the bottom in late March 2009, chartists
and noise traders seem to have become optimistic and switched their esti-
mates for vt and σt from regime 0 to regime 1. Such a market mood however
only lasts for a few month before gloom takes over again; both chartists and
noise traders gradually switched from regime 1 to regime 0 in early 2010.
Both types of traders eventually cluster their estimate to regime 0 from May
2010 onwards, which may hint at the possibility that the market seems to be
running the risk of encountering a double dip depression. Overall, our esti-
mates suggest that chartists expect low (high) short-term market value while
17Table 3: Regime classiﬁcation based on smoothed probability
Regime Start End Probability* Months Total Months
Regime 0 2000(10) 2003(2) 0.938 29 51
(Busting) 2007(9) 2009(4) 0.920 20
2010(5) 2010(6) 0.892 2
Regime 1 2000(1) 2000(9) 0.758 9 75
(Booming) 2003(3) 2007(8) 0.956 54
2009(5) 2010(4) 0.844 12
* the average probability for vs,t to be in regime s between the start and end period.
noise traders forecast high (low) volatility during bust (boom) periods. In
other words, they are bearish when the market undergoes a depressed period
and bullish when the market booms. State 0 (state 1) not only captures the
characterizations of the ﬁnancially bust (boom) periods, but also matches
well with the historical span of turbulent (tranquil) ﬁnancial episodes. Al-
though the dates of ﬁnancial crises are not used in any way to estimate the
parameters or form inference about transition probabilities, it is interesting
that the turbulent and tranquil episodes correspond closely to the states 0
and 1 in our model.
Table 3 further classiﬁes the sample periods according to the regime
switching probability. Among the 126 sample periods we study, there are
a total of 51 months (40.48%) in regime 0 when the market is depressed and
a total of 75 months (59.52%) in regime 1 when the market is booming. The
average duration of remaining in regime 0 consecutively is 17 months, which
is shorter than that of staying in regime 1, which is 25 months. However,
given the incomplete episodes at the beginning and at the end of our sample,
it does not necessary mean that tranquil episodes are more persistent than
turbulent episodes.
In summary, the estimation results provide evidence of between-group
behavioural heterogeneity and within-group heterogeneity. Moreover, the
classiﬁed regimes match well with the market booms and busts in actual
ﬁnancial episodes. Under the current set up, the short-term market value
is state dependent, but not the extrapolation parameter β of the chartists.
Intuitively, chartists may react diﬀerently when facing diﬀerent market con-
ditions. This implies that the parameter β can also be state dependent. In
Appendix B, we estimate the model to allow the parameter β to be state
18dependent as well. The estimation results show that this model has similar
explanatory power. However the classiﬁcation of the regimes in this model
is less accurate. Also, it exhibits poorer out-of-sample forecasting accuracy,
see Appendix B for the detailed discussion.
4 Out-of-Sample Predictability
In order to evaluate the model speciﬁcation under regime switching, we com-
pare the out-of-sample predictability of the model with Boswijk et al (2007).
However, before comparing the predictive power, we review the model spec-
iﬁcation in Boswijk et al (2007).
4.1 Review of the Boswijk et al (2007) Model
Boswijk et al (2007) assume two type of investors, who predict future price by
extrapolating past deviation of the price dividend ratio from its fundamental
ratio such that
Eh,t [ut+1/dt+1 − pt+1/dt+1] = θh (ut−1/dt−1 − pt−1/dt−1), h = 1,2,
where θ1  = θ2. Let xt = ut/dt − pt/dt so that the last equation can be
simpliﬁed to
Eh,t(xt+1) = θhxt−1, h = 1,2.
Investors update their market weight every period according to the most
recent realized proﬁts. The proportion of investor type 1 at period t, n1,t,















measures the diﬀerence in realized proﬁts of investors of
type 1 compared to type 2. The equilibrium price under the assumption of
zero external supply satisﬁes
xt = n1,tθ1xt−1 + (1 − n1,t)θ2xt−1 + ǫt, (11)
9See Boswijk et al (2007) for a detailed derivation of the market weight n1,t and n2,t.
19Table 4: Nonlinear least square estimation results for the Boswijk et al (2007)
model
Variable ρ θ1 θ2
Coeﬃcient 0.768 .944 1.051
p-value .579 .000 .000
log-likelihood =−649.946, AIC=10.783
where ǫt is a disturbance term. Equation (11) means that the current de-
viation of the price dividend ratio from its fundamental ratio is a market
proportion weighted average of the investor expected deviations plus a noise
term.
Following Boswijk et al (2007), we estimate Eq.(11) with nonlinear least
square using the data sample from January 2000 to June 2010. The esti-
mation results shown in Table 4 are in line with Boswijk et al (2007). The
coeﬃcient of θ1 and θ2 are statistically signiﬁcant, suggesting the presence of
between-group behavioural heterogeneity. The intensity of choice ρ is not sta-
tistically signiﬁcant, so there is no evidence that investors of one type switch
to a diﬀerent type. In terms of in-sample estimation, the log-likelihood and
AIC suggests that the BHM model shares similar explanatory power to our
model over the same sample period.
4.2 Forecasting Accuracy
To compare the out-of-sample forecasting accuracy of our model with Boswijk
et al (2007), we divide the data sample into two segments; one for the in-
sample estimation, the other for the out-of-sample comparison. Speciﬁcally,
we run regression using data from January 2000 to May 2009, on the basis of
which we forecast the price from June 2009 to June 2010. We then compare
the forecast series with the actual price. As can be seen in Fig. 5, the model
with regime-dependent beliefs exhibits better forecasting accuracy. Such out-
performance is consistent for up to 13 month forecasting horizons.
Since the separation of the sample is somewhat arbitrary, a natural ques-
tion is whether the result is sensitive to the sample selection. As a robustness
check, we compare the forecasting performance using the root mean square
error (RMSE) and mean absolute error (MAE) for diﬀerent forecasting hori-
zons. Speciﬁcally, we calculate the h-months-ahead forecasting error, for
h = 1,2,...,12. The forecasting recursion is based on a rolling estimation win-
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Figure 5: Comparison of out-of-sample predicability in three HAMs. The
solid line plots the actual price series discounted by the CPI. the dashed and
dash-dotted lines correspond to the forecast prices from Eq. (8) and Boswijk
et al (2007) (BHM) model, respectively.
dow with a ﬁxed sample size, which is 96 (8 years of data) in our practice. We
estimate the model applying the ﬁrst 96 observations (p1,p2,...,p96), and then
obtain the ﬁrst h-months-ahead forecasts (e p96+1,..., e p96+h). Similarly, we ob-
tain the second h-months-ahead forecasts (e p97+1,..., e p97+h) from observations
(p2,p3,...,p97). Such a process is repeated until we obtain the last h-months-
ahead forecasts (e p126−h+1,..., e p126) from observations (p31−h,p32−h,...,p126−h)
(126 is the total number of observations in the full sample). This recursion
leads to to a sequence of kh = 126 − 96 + 1 − h = 31 − h density fore-









t=96 |e pt+h − pt+h|
kh
.
Note that the smaller the value of RMSE and MAE, the better the fore-
casting accuracy. The results from RMSE and MAE are broadly in line with
the simple segmentation discussed above. The second and third columns of
Table 5 present the RMSE from our model estimated under Markov regime
switching and the Boswijk et al (2007) model estimated using nonlinear least
square estimation. The fourth and ﬁfth columns show the MAE for the two
models. For forecasting horizons 1 to 12 months, both RMSE and MAE are
smaller in our model than in the Boswijk et al (2007) model. These results
21Table 5: Forecasting Error
Steps RMSE MAE
BHM RD∗ εt and vt BHM RD εt and vt
1 272 71 105 50
2 302 120 155 86
3 332 153 191 111
4 362 189 227 136
5 405 240 277 173
6 454 288 332 211
7 498 324 380 246
8 535 354 416 284
9 572 391 449 321
10 614 428 484 353
11 645 445 512 369
12 672 456 529 384
RD stands for regime-dependent
suggest that models estimated with regime-dependent beliefs possess better
forecasting accuracy than the nonlinear model in Boswijk et al (2007).
5 Conclusion
We develop a HAM within the framework of Markov-switching by allowing
investor beliefs (trading strategies) to be regime dependent. Such a set up
improves the forecasting accuracy compared to the nonlinear least square
estimation that is frequently applied in estimating HAMs. This may be
attributed to the unobservable state variable that captures the underlying
switch of diﬀerent market condition through the data.
Our estimation results show that chartists and noise traders exist in the
market simultaneously, which is consistent with the results in current lit-
erature that document between-group heterogeneity (Boswijk et al (2007);
Frijns et al 2010). Perhaps more interestingly, we also ﬁnd that behavioural
heteogeneity could arise within the group, as investors adapt their strategies
over time based on the state variable. Moreover, the regime-dependent prop-
erty of this model captures a smooth transition from boom to bust periods
and vice versa. Our estimation classiﬁes the sample periods into two regimes,
22which match well the crisis and boom periods in real ﬁnancial episodes.
Due to the relatively large number of parameters to be estimated, we try
to keep our model as simple as possible. This raises several caveats on our
results. First, we estimate a two-state Markov switching model. The market
conditions however cannot be captured by only two states, which simply
divide the sample into boom and bust periods. One future research direction
would be to extend the model to N-states so that it captures the business
cycle at diﬀerent stages of development. This may require higher frequency
data, which makes it easier to obtain stable estimates. Second, the demand
function in our model is highly aggregated, rendering it diﬃcult to shed light
on the behaviour of investors whose beliefs are oﬀset by the other type within
the same group. Extending the model to account for more disaggregated
trading strategies would be a valuable contribution to the literature.
Appendix
A. Multicollinearity
Note that the demand by fundamentalists and chartists might be correlated,
especially when the short-term market value vt is close to the fundamental
value ut over certain time periods. If this is the case, the estimated standard
errors of the aﬀected coeﬃcients tend to be large as a result of multicollinear-
ity, which could give rise to the misleading conclusion that the coeﬃcient
is zero. We check for such possibility by testing the null hypothesis that
α = β = 0. Our test rejects the hypothesis, which indicates the presence of
multicollinearity. We then drop the demand function of the fundamentalists
from Eq.(8) and run the estimation again. The results are shown in Table
6. As expected, the estimate of β becomes highly signiﬁcant. The results
indicate that the market power of chartists B, who believe the price trend
(pt−vt) will reverse, is greater than that of chartists A, who expect the price
trend to persist. If we drop the demand function of chartists from Eq.(8) in-
stead, the estimation of α becomes statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level,
as shown in Table 7. It is diﬃcult to rule out the presence of fundamentalists.
Note that the multicollinearity problem aﬀects the estimation of the stan-
dard error but not the entire model goodness of ﬁt, neither does it bias the
results. If we simply drop the demand by fundamentalists, the omission of a
possibly relevant variable would result in biased estimation for the remaining
23Table 6: Estimation results excluding fundamentalists. The sample period
is from January 2000 to June 2010.
Variable β v0 v1 σ0 σ1 P0,0 P0,1
Coeﬃcient −.044 644.680 1617.007 63.631 31.590 .945 .049
p-value .01 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .120
log-likelihood=−663.103, AIC=10.637
Table 7: Estimation results excluding chartists. The sample period is from
January 2000 to June 2010.
Variable α σ0 σ1 P0,0 P0,1
Coeﬃcient .027 70.034 35.413 .954 .033
p-value .091 .000 .000 .000 .236
log-likelihood=−671.483, AIC=10.738
explanatory variables. To avoid this problem, we focus on the estimation of
the model that incorporates the trading activities of fundamentalists, despite
the multicolinearity.
B. Regime-dependent β
In estimating the model in the main test, the parameter β, the response
factor of the price to the estimation bias, was assumed to be constant. In
this appendix, we allow β to be state-dependent such that
β = βt =
￿
β0, st = 0,
β1, st = 1. (12)
This further allows chartists to update their market weight as well as their
sensitivity to the estimation bias given that β = γ (βAω2 − βBω3). Note
however that there is not enough information to diﬀerentiate the origins of
the switch in β.
Table 8 shows the estimation results for Eq.(12). Consistent with the
previous estimation, the volatility is higher in regime 0 than in regime 1. As
demonstrated in Fig. 6, the ﬁtted value based on our model matches well the
real price series and the 1-step ahead prediction captures the ups and downs
of the price movements even when they are extreme.
24Table 8: The 2-state Markov regime switching in β and v. The sample period
is from January 2000 to June 2010.
Variable β0 β1 α v0 v1
Coeﬃcient 0.023 −0.060 0.014 2532.370 1515.315
p-value 0.607 0.038 0.571 .000 .000
σ0 σ1 P0,0 P0,1
62.160 29.221 0.958 0.043
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.162
log-likelihood =−662.303, AIC=10.656
The classiﬁcation of regimes are broadly in line with previous estimation,
as shown in Fig. 7, the regime 0 is centered around crisis periods while regime
1 corresponds to tranquil periods. Similarly, α is positive but insigniﬁcant.
The estimation of β is positive in regime 0 and negative in regime 1. However
it is only signiﬁcant in regime 1. The expected short-term fundamental is
higher in regime 0 than in regime 1 with v0 = 1910 and v1 = 1685. The
estimation results in regime 0 is quite diﬀerent from the previous estimation,
which is however not signiﬁcant. This may due to the under-identiﬁcation of
our model, making it diﬃcult to distinguish where the switching comes from.
The in-sample estimation of the current model has similar explanatory
power to the previous model with a regime dependent price benchmark and
noise term. However, the classiﬁcation of the regimes in this model is less
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Figure 6: The index, ﬁtted value, and 1-step-ahead prediction when β is
allowed to switch. The solid line represents the S&P 500 Index discounted
by the CPI, the dashed line plots the ﬁtted value from the estimation of
Eq. (12), the circles reﬂect the 1-step ahead forecast, and the shaded areas
indicate regime 0.
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